

Unionism after Good Friday and St Andrews

HENRY PATTERSON

IN ORDER to assess the current state of Unionism it is necessary to understand the transition it has undergone as a result of its response to and involvement in the Peace Process. The period from the first Irish Republican Army (IRA) ceasefire in 1994 to the St Andrews Agreement in 2006 can be seen as a transitional one in which a number of currents struggled for hegemony. The decades-long leadership of the Ulster Unionist party (UUP) was finally and definitively destroyed. In the 1997 general election, the UUP received 32.7 per cent of the vote and won ten of Northern Ireland's seventeen seats at Westminster. The Democratic Unionist party (DUP) won 13.6 per cent and two seats. By the time of the 2005 general election the situation had been transformed: the UUP was reduced to 17.7 per cent of the vote and one seat, while the DUP obtained 33.7 per cent and nine seats.¹

During the years of direct rule, the then leader of the UUP, James Molyneaux, had identified the party with a policy that prioritised the province's links with the rest of the United Kingdom and focused attention on Westminster rather than on involvement in attempts to develop a devolved government in Northern Ireland. This policy was based on idea that the terms on which devolution would be available—power-sharing with nationalists and a strong set of institutional links with the Irish Republic—made its price too high. For his Unionist critics Molyneaux's approach had led to the detested Anglo-Irish Agreement and the lesson which his successor and chief

critic, David Trimble, took from it was that unless Unionism proactively engaged with its opponents it would be marginalised and have pro-nationalist policies imposed on it.

However, it became obvious within months of the signing of the Good Friday Agreement that Trimble's arguments had the support of a bare majority of the Unionist electorate. In the election for the Northern Ireland Assembly, carried out on the basis of proportional representation, the UUP won with 21 per cent of the vote and 28 seats as against 25 seats held by the anti-Agreement DUP and the smaller United Kingdom Unionist party. As at least three of the UUP's own contingent were also anti-Agreement the ideological battle within Unionism had clearly not been won by Trimble and his supporters. By the next Assembly election in 2003 the DUP had moved into lead position, if only narrowly, but by the 2007 election the reversal of the parties' fortunes was clear: the DUP on 30 per cent and 36 seats to the UUP's 15 per cent and 18.²

During the period of transition, commentators on Unionism were prone to point to its political and ideological complexity, identifying the potential for new and progressive tendencies to emerge. One current was a 'new Unionism' associated with elements identified with David Trimble. This argued for a civic 'British' Unionism based on a broader conception of the Union and the advantages, economic, social and cultural, that flowed from Northern Ireland's membership of the United Kingdom. Its ambition

was to both appeal to that section of the Catholic community that, opinion polls demonstrated, favoured remaining in the United Kingdom, and also to bring back into Unionist politics those small 'u' unionists—mostly middle-class and professional protestants in the east of the province who, it was argued, were alienated from what they considered Unionism's parochial and often sectarian nature.

New Unionism argued that since the Anglo-Irish Agreement, Irish nationalists had defined the terms in which any settlement of the Northern Ireland conflict would be resolved. Unionism had adopted a blinkered and defensive position, refusing to engage with its opponents and had been marginalised accordingly. The IRA ceasefire and the attractions of a non-violent republicanism to the British state meant that unless Unionists engaged with the emergent Peace Process the road to a further attenuation of the Union through some form of joint authority was clear. Although these arguments made Trimble the most appealing Unionist leader to elite and media opinion in Britain, he encountered an increasingly hostile reaction in the UUP's support base in Northern Ireland. Here he followed previous reformist Unionist leaders like Terence O'Neill and Brian Faulkner, whose embrace of political initiatives from Westminster divided and weakened their party.

The other current was the 'new loyalism' associated particularly with the Progressive Unionist party (PUP) and its leader, David Ervine. It was based on former members of the loyalist paramilitary group, the Ulster Volunteer Force. The weaker Ulster Democratic party (UDP) was linked to the other main loyalist group, the Ulster Defence Association. Loyalist paramilitaries had declared ceasefires after the IRA's in 1994 and their prisoners had benefitted from the early release provisions of the

Good Friday Agreement. The 'new loyalism' supported the Agreement and attempted to proselytise for support in protestant working-class areas. Their narrative was that what they called 'middle unionism'—that is, the UUP and DUP, ignored and neglected the interests of working-class loyalists. Unlike the IRA which had been able to combine violence with, from the 1980s, a substantial degree of electoral support, the protestant community had by-and-large refused to give political support to parties linked to loyalist terrorist groups.

In the immediate aftermath of the Agreement the PUP played a role in sustaining the pro-Agreement majority amongst Unionist representatives in the Northern Ireland Assembly. Their rather exculpatory narrative of being encouraged to engage in anti-republican and sectarian violence by 'respectable' Unionists like the DUP leader of the time, Ian Paisley, and the articulate, if prolix, David Ervine's, high media profile did enable them to establish a foothold—albeit a precarious one in local politics. Their support base was small: in the 1998 Assembly elections the PUP won 2.5 per cent of the vote and two seats, while the UDP failed to get representation. Despite having a number of intelligent, articulate and media-savvy leaders, the PUP and the UDP never succeeded in emerging from the shadow of the gunmen, drug dealers and criminals of the rump loyalist terrorist groups. They were also victims of a more general hardening of Unionist opinion against the Peace Process which by the early part of the new century was seen to be a one-way street of concessions to Sinn Fein.

Some authors have pointed to the political skills of the DUP in their strategy of internal opposition to the Agreement. Exploiting the system of mandatory coalition which gave them ministerial office in the new multiparty government, they refused to attend executive meetings in protest against the presence of Sinn Fein

ministers while at the same time running their own ministerial fiefdoms. They were criticised for inconsistency and hypocrisy by other anti-Agreement Unionists in the Assembly and also by some grassroots members of their own party. However, their argument that the best way to defeat the Agreement and in the interim resist the agenda of Sinn Fein was by a policy of qualified participation not sterile rejectionism resonated with a disaffected Unionist electorate. In general, therefore, increasing support for the DUP was a reflection of the broad feeling amongst the Unionist electorate, including many of those who had supported the Agreement, that they had been sold a false prospectus by David Trimble and Tony Blair in 1998.

The souring of opinion was rapid, not helped by the delay in forming a government and then by its manifest internal divisions and frequent crises and suspensions. According to the *Northern Ireland Life and Times* survey there was a steep decline in the percentage of Unionists believing the Agreement had benefitted Nationalists and Unionists equally from 41 per cent in 1998 to 19 per cent in 2002.³ In his frustration with the Unionists Blair had echoed Paul Bew's comment on Unionists and the Agreement: 'When the UUs are like this, they are so ridiculously unreasonable. They are too stupid to realise they have won and SF are too clever to admit they've lost.'⁴

However, Trimble's argument that the Agreement was a partitionist document and that Irish nationalists *de jure* and republicans *de facto* had accepted the principle of consent to any change in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland ignored some fundamental realities. One was, ironically enough, referred to by Gerry Adams when he admitted that Unionists would not be grateful to the IRA for stopping shooting and bombing them. If the irredentism of successive Irish governments and the violence of the Provos had failed to bring Irish unity

why, the argument went, should the acceptance of the consent principle and the end of the 'armed struggle' be rewarded by what the DUP denounced as the destruction of the Britishness of the North?

There was also the profound disjuncture between what Kaufmann refers to as the consequentialist, 'big picture' morality of the Peace Process enunciated by the British government, and the Kantian 'first principles' moral sense of the Unionist electorate. The first position claimed that the Agreement was a necessary historic compromise that by ending the conflict saved lives—especially those of a broad section of the Unionist electorate. However, an unfortunate by-product of this process was to elevate perpetrators and ignore the thousands of victims of the Provisionals. When Tony Blair and Mo Mowlam were trying to sell the Agreement to the leaders of the Orange Order, the Orangemen were particularly exercised by the Agreement's provision for the early release of paramilitary prisoners. One raised the question of the murder of four Orangemen in one of the numerous Provo sectarian attacks along the border of Northern Ireland. 'Where is the morality,' he asked in releasing someone guilty of a crime like the Tullyvallen massacre.⁵ Blair's response was that there would be no deal without the prisoners. This one argument makes clear the divergence between the moral universe of many Unionists and that of Blair, who depicted the deal on the prisoners as part of the historic compromise necessary to bring violence to an end.

Trimble was dealt another blow by the publication of the Patten report on policing in September 1999. The radical reform of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the change of name and the removal of all 'British' symbolism from the police were seen by many Unionists as an insult to those who had paid a heavy price at the hands of the Provisionals during the Troubles. The report

soon fitted into a broad rejectionist narrative of a 'drip drip' process of concessions to republicans the end result of which was an inversion of what Unionists regarded as the real hierarchy of responsibility for the deaths and devastation of the Troubles, where the Provisionals had been responsible for 48 per cent of the deaths and the RUC for just 1.4 per cent.

This period is crucial when we come to consider the present condition of Unionism, for it is the argument of this article that the manifest divisions within Unionism over how to respond to political and paramilitary events after 1998 led many observers to an overly negative view of its prospects. Reading some analyses it often seemed that Unionists were being set an examination they were bound to fail. They were found wanting for cleaving to an 'outmoded' conception of Britishness which the secularised, liberal and multicultural 'mainland' has consigned to the historical junk-heap. They were judged to have a 'dismal vision' and to reflexively always grasp defeat from the jaws of victory. They were lacking in the forward projection and 'progressive' sentiments of nationalists, stuck in a purely negative and reactive mode.

Unionists did have profound problems with the Peace Process. This was because although it is often projected as being about an historic compromise between unionists/loyalists and nationalists/republicans, it was fundamentally a protracted negotiation between the British state and the Provisional IRA to end IRA violence and reduce radically direct British involvement in Northern Ireland. Unionists were essential to this process because the bedrock of any deal had to be some form of power-sharing settlement within Northern Ireland, but they were never at its centre. Anyone who doubts this should read the Alastair Campbell *Diaries* for 1999–2001, where it is brutally clear what Blair and Campbell thought about Trimble and the other Unionists with whom they had to deal. In 1999, at

a time when the IRA had not decommissioned a single bullet but when Blair was urging Trimble to accept that Sinn Fein's purely verbal and conditional commitment to address the issue was 'historic' and merited Unionist acceptance of republicans in government, Campbell records his boss's sentiments after a meeting with Trimble and his colleagues:

He had started out in government determined to like the Unionists, and always try to understand their point of view, but they made it bloody hard. 'The other side may kill people but at least you can have rational conversations.'⁶

Unionists had long lost the ideological war in the rest of the United Kingdom and not simply amongst the *Guardianistas*. Blair appears to have got his background knowledge of Northern Ireland from Michael Farrell's republican/socialist critique of the old Stormont regime *Northern Ireland: The Orange State*.⁷ Thirty years after the abolition of Stormont, at a time when the inequalities and discrimination that had fuelled the civil rights movement had been largely eliminated, Blair still believed that a system of 'Unionist supremacy' existed in Northern Ireland

The former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Mandelson, has pointed out the uphill struggle that Trimble had with his boss, criticising Blair for giving in too easily to 'excessive and unreasonable' republican demands because of his fear that the IRA would go back to war.⁸ The UUP's slogan in the 1998 election 'No Guns No Government' was mocked and Trimble humiliated by repeated instances of IRA activity over the next seven years from a break-in at a key police facility to the Northern Bank robbery in 2005. The DUP had long been a more activist and professional organisation than the UUP, but in this period it could rely on republicans to do its work for it by making Trimble appear increasingly as Adams and McGuinness's useful idiot.

Ironically, Trimble and the UUP can be seen as having been historically vindicated in their argument that by entering into the institutions created by the Agreement, republicans had become *de facto* partitionists. In the strategic long-term they were right, but in electoral terms they ignored the existential revulsion of many Unionists at the very idea of McGuinness in government in a Northern Ireland emerging from three decades of violence. This rejectionism was maintained by the IRA's failure to decommission: because as long as the issue of IRA weapons was not resolved, the media focus was maintained on the negotiations between the British government and Adams/McGuinness and this gave the process its incomplete and, hence to Unionists, its threatening nature. The St Andrews Agreement (October 2006) and the subsequent acceptance by Sinn Fein of the legitimacy of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), while not altering the structures of the Good Friday Agreement significantly, marked the end of the period when Unionists were predisposed to see the process as a one-way street of concessions to republicans. By this time most had acclimatised to the idea of a significant Sinn Fein presence in government and many of Trimble's arguments on the way that devolution would act as a means of integrating republicans into the Northern Irish state have been vindicated.

For Unionists, the DUP has been able to argue plausibly that the worst is over: republicans in government, early release of paramilitary prisoners, police reform all occurred on the UUP's watch and the party can insouciantly argue that they were not responsible but have to make the best of a bad job. The emergence of Jim Allister's Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) as a forceful critic of the DUP's going into to government with Sinn Fein represented the unease felt by a substantial minority of the party's traditional supporters with what was seen as its

betrayal of its previous opposition to 'terrorists in government'. In the 2010 Westminster elections the DUP's vote slumped by 8 per cent and its leader, Peter Robinson, lost his East Belfast constituency which he had held since 1979 to the Alliance party's Naomi Long. Although part of the vote loss was undoubtedly due to disaffection over Robinson sharing government with McGuinness, there was also distaste at what was seen as the empire-building tendencies, close relations with property developers and lifestyle of Robinson and his disgraced wife, Iris, the former MP for Strangford. However, in the 2011 assembly elections the DUP bounded back while the TUV failed to make an impact outside of Allister's own election in North Antrim.

In electoral terms, Unionism's position in the Assembly is little altered since 1998. Then there was a Unionist bloc of 55 MLAs (not including six Alliance party MLAs) to a nationalist/republican bloc of 42. In 2011 the respective figures are 54 and 43 with eight Alliance. Ironically, it is at Westminster where the greatest shift in voting strength has occurred: in 1997 there were 13 Unionist MPs to four Sinn Fein/SDLP MPs; in 2011 the figures are nine and eight, respectively, with one Alliance MP. However, the electoral weight of the nationalist /republican bloc is vitiated by Sinn Fein's abstentionist policy.

Nationalism North and South

Strategically there has been a continuity of fundamentals since the argument used by the DUP in favour of devolution inclusive of Sinn Fein—that it is an indicator of the failure of the republican project—is the same as Trimble used in 1998. Martin McGuinness's denunciations of the dissident republican terrorists as 'traitors to Ireland' and the party's support for people giving information to the Security Forces has earned him the

traditional republican anathema of ‘felon setter’—that is, an Irishman who helps the imperial enemy to repress fellow Irishmen. The SDLP had raised more critical noise about the building of a substantial new MI5 base at Holywood than Sinn Fein. One Sinn Fein MLA even raised the possibility of a special PSNI anti-terrorist unit—the sort of formation that republicans would have denounced as a ‘death squad’ during the Troubles. On the vexed question of dealing with the legacy of the Troubles there have been signs of more republican revisionism. In his efforts to sanitise his past for his bid for the Irish Presidency McGuinness has now accepted, albeit in convoluted terms, that IRA killing of civilians could be described as murder. On the economic front it has become clear that Sinn Fein’s approach to the Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition’s austerity package is no different from that of the DUP and in sharp contrast to its more leftist position in the Republic. One Southern commentator wondered

Is Sinn Fein really a left-wing party at all? . . . The Stormont budget for 2011–15 as presented by Sinn Fein, with the DUP, includes a reduction of £4 billion in public expenditure, an 8 per cent cut in current spending, a 40 per cent cut in capital spending, and a public sector pay freeze for all those earning over £21,000 annually.⁹

The longstanding British elite desire to insulate Northern Ireland from the rest of the United Kingdom political system has often been accompanied by a *sotto voce* hope that eventually the two parts of the island would merge. The Celtic Tiger encouraged such delusions. This historically amnesiac worldview of the metropolitan political and administrative class and much of the media so apparent in Campbell’s *Diaries* was given pungent expression by Max Hastings in response to loyalist disturbances after the rerouting of an Orange Order march in west Belfast. The riots were a sign a manifesta-

tion not of Protestant power, but of frustration and impotence:

They see their world decay towards oblivion. The Unionist transfer of allegiance to Paisley and the extinction of David Trimble, represent a rejection of rational politics, a resort to the absurd such as only desperate people could entertain. Most middle class Protestants now expect a united Ireland and are untroubled by the prospect. As often in modern history economics is achieving what politics has not. In 1969 Ulster’s prosperity and welfare state viewed against the South’s poverty, provided powerful reasons for many Catholics as well as Protestants to fear a united Ireland. Today the position is transformed. Northern Ireland has nothing to lose but its subsidies while the South is rich and successful. No constituency which gives its political support to a leader such as Paisley possesses a plausible vision of its own future.¹⁰

Northern Ireland, even under the Coalition and despite David Cameron’s alarm at the ‘East European’ level of dependence on the public sector, will continue to benefit from the annual Treasury subvention—albeit a somewhat shrunken one. There was never any chance of the Republic, even at height of the boom, doing more than topping up the annual Treasury subvention. Gone are the vistas of a bereft Northern Ireland being absorbed by the beneficent ‘Celtic Tiger’ in the Republic. Condescending British commentators like Hastings also ignored the fact that the Good Friday Agreement was for the Irish state fundamentally about stabilising the North and maintaining the insulation of the region from the Republic’s politics.

The reaction in the Republic to McGuinness’s bid for the Presidency has demonstrated the strength of partitionism in the South. Some Northern nationalist commentators have noted what they consider the Republic’s political and media classes’ double standards in welcoming McGuinness’s role as Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland while declaring him unfit for the Presidency

because of his leading role in the Provos. The same point was made by Sean Woodward, the former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Woodward's intervention provoked the ire of the Irish historian Ronan Fanning for his 'historical ignorance and anglo-centric condescension'. For Fanning, the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement were 'tortuously cobbled together to end a dirty little 30 year war . . . what is expedient in the still dysfunctional statelet of Northern Ireland is as irrelevant as it is utterly undesirable in an independent republic with a genuine and continuous democratic tradition'.¹¹ Unionists may enjoy a moment of *schadenfreude* at this manifestation of 26 County nationalism provoked by the very figure they have been told to appreciate for his role at Stormont, but more fundamentally it demonstrates that for the majority of the population in the Republic the North remains like the past for the elderly man in L. P. Hartley's *The Go Between*: 'a foreign country they do things differently there'.

Austerity is unlikely to shake these fundamentals. It poses a problem for all Northern Ireland¹² parties whose default position until recently was Keynesian. However, the very lack of economic levers to pull by the Executive gives it a get-out clause as the misery intensifies: these are 'Tory cuts' which Robinson and McGuinness claim to have resisted and done their utmost to palliate in those policies we do have control of. After the failure of the UUP's attempt to forge an electoral alliance with the Conservatives in 2010, the links with the Tories have been played down and the party has only raised the faintest of protests at the regionalist populism of the DUP/Sinn Fein approach to the economy. It might have been thought that the UUP as a Unionist party would have pointed up the implications of devolving corporation tax to the assembly in breaking up fiscal unity of the United Kingdom. Unionists of the civic 'British' sort find much of the

present devolved settlement tainted by 'little Ulster' nationalism and parochialism. Looking for a special dispensation on corporation tax whilst discriminating against students from other parts of the United Kingdom on the issue of student fees leaves a sour taste in the mouth of some Unionists.

The year 2012 will see Unionists celebrate the centenary of the signing of the Ulster Covenant: the declaration of Ulster protestants from all nine counties of the province that they would resist any attempt to put them under a Home Rule parliament in Dublin controlled by Irish nationalists. This founding event in the Unionist narrative took place at a time when a strong industrial and commercial bourgeoisie and large protestant working class could provide the basis for the partition of the island and the creation of a state in the North. The last manifestation of this sort of protestant power was the Ulster Workers Council strike in 1974, but by then it was clear that protestant capacity was radically reduced: it was a purely negative one.

Since the arrival of the welfare state in 1945 Unionism has been materially dependent on the British state, and this dependence deepened substantially during the Troubles. The root of Unionism's 'dismal vision', its oft-noted pessimism of outlook, was a result of this dependence at a time, during the Troubles from 1979 onwards, when the British governing class increasingly inclined to the idea that the IRA campaign could only be ended with the aid of the Irish state and that the price for this would be political and constitutional concessions to the Republic. From the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) to the Good Friday Agreement, Unionist strategy was predominantly one of damage limitation.

The structures of the 1998 Agreement, modified in 2006, are part of this inheritance. As critics, including David Cameron, point out, they reflect more the communal parcelisation of power

and mutual vetoes than power-sharing between the two blocs. This can be wasteful in terms of duplication of resources and lead to prevarication and long delays on important decisions. But such criticisms are based on a rather naïve view of what the Peace Process has been about. It was about shutting down the Provisionals in an internationally acceptable way, not about overcoming sectarian divisions or providing good government for Northern Ireland.

For the first time since 1968 unionists are not faced with a British government pressing them for radical changes or the coercive presence of an IRA campaign or the threat of one: the dissidents are a pale and pathetic imitation of the Provos. In that sense, the Union appears more secure than at any time since the 1950s. While in the 1950s the Union was maintained on the basis of the political domination of one communal/ethnic bloc, today it is mediated through two co-equal blocs. The inevitable consequences are the frequent clashes over cultural and identity issues like those over an Irish Language Act, over contested parades or the flying of Union flag at Belfast City Hall. The ongoing disputes about dealing with the past will continue despite Owen Patterson's ruling out of a Truth Commission to deal with the legacy of the Troubles. Although such disputes are at times the source of violence (for example, frequent arson attacks on Orange halls), they do not possess the capacity to destabilise the ruling regime. Much more fundamental is the enthusiastic administration of the 6 County state by those who spent thirty years trying to destroy it. Before the collapse of social democracy it was possible for Unionist integrationists to argue a positive case for the Union as providing the only framework in which traditional communal allegiances could be weakened and new cross-sectarian identities developed. Now the more sordid reality is that the Union provides the best framework in

which these allegiances and identities can co-exist on a basis of relative civility.

If the period when a leading Unionist intellectual could refer to Northern Ireland as 'something akin to a constitutional granny flat perched on the edge of the Union'¹³ has ended, Unionism still faces major challenges. Security bred complacency, intellectual stagnation and intense parochialism, in the heyday of the Stormont regime. It was the challenge of the Anglo-Irish Agreement that stimulated the growth of new Unionism in the 1990s. Today that impetus has largely dissipated. In the local universities in 2009 protestant school leavers accounted for 35.8 per cent of the new entrants and Catholics for 57.6 per cent. The overall religious break-down for all school leavers was 41 per cent protestant and 50 per cent Catholic. An equality impact assessment noted that young protestant boys were less likely to participate in higher education than their Catholic counterparts. Under-representation was particularly a problem for young protestants from lower socio-economic groups.¹⁴ Unionism may be safely ensconced demographically and constitutionally, but its presence in those institutions which are central to reproduction of cultural capital—the universities and the media—is weaker than it has ever been.

As Northern Ireland faces a decade of commemorations, inquiries and inquests that will focus predominantly on the actions of the Security Forces during the Troubles, Unionism's intellectual and ideological weaknesses have the capacity to become its Achilles' heel.

Notes

- 1 Northern Ireland Elections, <http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections>
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 H. Patterson, *Ireland since 1939: The Persistence of Conflict*, London, Penguin, 2007, p. 348.
- 4 Quoted in A. Campbell, *Diaries, Volume*

- Three: Power and Responsibility*, 25 June 1999, ebook, location 1924.
- 5 E. P. Kaufmann, *The Orange Order: A Contemporary Northern Irish History*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.
 - 6 Campbell, *Diaries*, location 1924.
 - 7 M. Farrell, *Northern Ireland: The Orange State*, London, Pluto Press, 1976.
 - 8 M. Summers, 'Mandelson recording released', *Guardian*, 13 March 2007.
 - 9 E. Delaney, 'Welcome to the new, flexible mainstream Sinn Fein', *Sunday Independent*, 18 September 2011.
 - 10 M. Hastings, 'A society beached by history', *Guardian Weekly*, 27–29 August 2005.
 - 11 R. Fanning, 'Brass neck aplenty, demagoguery and accusations of false memory syndrome', *Sunday Independent*, 3 October 2011.
 - 12 Esmond Birnie, quoted in J. W. McAuley and J. Tonge, 'Britishness (and Irishness) in Northern Ireland since the Good Friday Agreement', *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 63, no. 2, 2010, p. 274.
 - 13 Esmond Birnie, quoted in J. W. McAuley and J. Tonge, 'Britishness (and Irishness) in Northern Ireland since the Good Friday Agreement', *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 63, no.2, 2010, p. 274.
 - 14 Department of Employment and Learning, *Equality Impact Assessment: Future Policy on Higher Education, Tuition Fees and Student Finance Arrangements in Northern Ireland*, <http://www.delni.gov.uk/eqa-future-policy-on-higher-education-tuition-fees>