Terroristic Narratives: On the (Re) Invention of Peace in Northern Ireland

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Version of record first published: 01 Jun 2011.

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*It has been argued that a key factor in explaining the relative success of the Northern
Ireland peace process is the role played by Non-Governmental Organisations
(NGOs) and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) in fostering dialogue and
promoting shared space for cooperation across the communal divide. This article
critically interrogates the normative import of that narrative, which implies that
NGOs and CBOs occupy a higher moral ground than state-sponsored agencies. In
large part this is attributed to both their indigenous character and their close proximity
to terrorist violence. Indeed, several of these NGOs and CBOs are staffed by individuals
who were convicted and imprisoned for terrorist-related offences. This article
is less concerned with the actions of these non-state actors than with the political and
moral foundations of the ''peace consultancy industry,'' which has grown up around
the design, implementation, and ongoing evaluation of these projects. We argue that
by importing tautological—and sometimes cynical—understandings of the term
''peace,'' these consultants risk complicity in reproducing the terroristic narratives
that inspired and perpetuated the conflict in the first instance.*

Keywords community relations, Northern Ireland, peace, terrorism, the state

> [T]o speak one version of reality in one direction and another version in
> another may in the short run look like clever diplomacy, but in the longer
> run will almost certainly be counterproductive.[1]

> [T]he disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former
> combatants and those associated with armed groups is a prerequisite
> for post-conflict stability and recovery.[2]

Introduction

A recent Parliamentary report on the perceived failure of a key strand of the British
Labour government's counter-terrorist strategy ("CONTEST") to prevent violent
Islamist extremism exposed the limitations of employing community-based resources
to "spy" on the Muslim community in the UK. Several recommendations were
made by the report's authors, which built on the assumption that "engaging" the
community was much better than "demonising" it. Thus,

> Any programme which focuses solely on one section of a community is
> stigmatising, potentially alienating, and fails to address the fact that no
> section of a population exists in isolation from others. The need to
> address extremism of all kinds on a cross-community basis, dependent
> on assessed local risk, is paramount.[3]

Yet there is something of a false logic in this analysis—namely, that it is better for
communities to throw off the yoke of violent extremism by building their own
indigenous social, economic, and democratic infrastructure "from below," than for
the state to "stigmatise" or "criminalise" marginal or excluded groups by sponsoring
"top-down" initiatives aimed at de-radicalisation. Recognising these dangers, the
report argued that "attempts to combine capacity building and community cohesion
work with counter-terrorism interventions have been both ineffective and counter-
productive."[4] Despite its criticisms, the report recommended that tackling "home-
grown" Islamist terrorism effectively means that the government's focus should be
on preventing individuals and small groups from becoming alienated from wider
British society.[5] Essentially, this policy entails challenging extremist voices and
"supporting" moderate opinion.[6] It means adopting a "positive" approach to coun-
ter-terrorism based on socio-economic improvements, but also the recognition that:

> Decisions as to how to tackle the conditions in which all forms of extrem-
> ism can develop need to be made at the local level, based on a risk assess-
> ment of the local area as a whole, rather than focusing on individual
> communities.[7]

Many of the illustrative examples in the Select Committee's report emphasise
how extremism was not a phenomenon intrinsic to the Muslim community in Great
Britain. Indeed, as one of the appendices included in the report reminds us, extrem-
ism has been alive and well in Northern Ireland for some time—despite the accom-
plishments of the peace process.[8] This is a point worth exploring in more detail,
especially in light of the growing number of shooting and bombing attacks by

dissident Irish republicans, who have capitalised on the disenchantment amongst a proportion of the Catholic nationalist community in the province inimical to Sinn Féin's current "peace strategy."[9]

The resurgence of dissident republican violence, particularly in the wake of Sinn Féin's acceptance of policing in 2007, has been a worrying development. There is considerable evidence that the unpredictable nature of dissident attacks was unexpected as the logic of New Labour's handling of the "peace process" played up the will of the majority of people in opposing terrorism. However, this credulous belief in the irrelevance of dissident republican strategy led to a downplaying (publicly at any rate) of the threat these groups posed. Meanwhile MI5 raised the threat level in Northern Ireland to severe, indicating that an attack was extremely likely. Almost four weeks later, on Friday 6 March, the then Chief Constable of the PSNI, Hugh Orde, held a press conference at which he stated that the threat from dissidents was at its highest in seven years.[10] Within 48 hours two soldiers and a police officer had been murdered by the Real and Continuity IRAs.

By the beginning of the summer MI5 was spending almost 15% of its annual budget on tackling dissident terrorism. Its Director General, Jonathan Evans, later told the cross-bench Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee,

> What was not anticipated when we went into this spending period was the way in which the situation in Northern Ireland has degenerated. In January 2010 the Service had considerably more what we would call priority 1, i.e., lifethreatening investigations, in Northern Ireland than we do in the rest of Great Britain.[11]

Dissident republicans were also alleged to have been behind street protests and the worst rioting since the troubles as the marching season got underway in 2009. Sinn Féin responded by downplaying the threat posed by these groups and challenged dissidents on the relevance of their strategy.[12] As the Independent Monitoring Commission noted in its report a year later, "[t]he seriousness, range and tempo had all changed for the worse"[13] in relation to dissident violence and that several key members of the Provisional IRA had "drifted" into dissident ranks.

In addition, the recent killing of a well-known loyalist on the Shankill Road in West Belfast by the Ulster Volunteer Force prompted the resignation of Dawn Purvis from the leadership of Progressive Unionist Party. It also threatened to unravel loyalist attempts to transform paramilitary organisations beyond violence, calling into question the sincerity of their commitment to the peace process.[14] As the IMC concluded, Mr Moffett had been publicly executed because "[h]e had behaved in ways which, in the eyes of the UVF, appeared to disregard the standing of the organisation, and he threatened some leading local figures in particular. Killing Mr Moffett was a way of dealing with the perceived threat."[15] The "peace process" remains precarious, despite the efforts of ex-terrorists and local politicians to persuade us otherwise.[16]

Notwithstanding the laudable intentions of the House of Commons report, the paradox of referring to "lessons learned" in Northern Ireland is, however, obvious to anyone with a passing interest in the changing political developments in the region. These developments have, arguably, been characterised by the fact that the former Labour government spent much of its 13 years in office buttressing radical voices and systematically isolating constitutional moderates represented by the Ulster

Unionist Party (UUP) and the Social Democratic and Labour Party, which held a demonstrable—if, albeit, on the part of the UUP, somewhat tenuous—electoral dominance at the time of the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement of 1998.[17]

Reinventing Peace in Northern Ireland

We are not primarily concerned with elucidating the ways in which the House of Commons report displays a shaky grasp of recent Northern Irish history; rather, we seek to stress how the report's ideas about Northern Ireland are perhaps inevitable given the ways that ex-terrorists' contributions to the peace process are represented by academics, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and community-based organisations (CBOs). Indeed, the picture we paint is substantively different from that which informs the House of Commons report—certainly, individuals within terrorist organisations and their associated political parties did an enormous amount of work in terms of encouraging their followers to recognise the necessity and the benefits of peace. Moreover, we argue that this occurred dialectically within these organisations rather than because of the inevitable tide of peace euphoria sweeping over the two communities. As one recent analysis of the role of ex-paramilitary prisoners in peace and reconciliation suggests, republican and loyalist terrorists maintained—or, more accurately, professed—a greater deal of political and ideological *continuity* during the period around and following the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement.[18]

Our second, and more fundamental, argument follows from this last point and relates to the fact that, actually, what is happening in Northern Ireland contradicts governmental best practice—as showcased in the House of Commons report. In other words, by overstating the role that terrorists and state-sponsored CBOs and NGOs (that include former terrorists in their ranks) have played in developing and sustaining peace in Northern Ireland a new idea of "peace" is actively being framed and constructed. This framing assumes that the inclusion of extremist bombers and gunmen is necessary for peace and stability;[19] it also includes assumptions about history and identity, insofar as it recycles terroristic understandings about the justness and inevitability of their actions.[20]

Moreover, and in correlation with the interpretation of several leading political scientists and historians writing about republicanism, we dispute the now-fashionable perception that the gestation of the "peace process" lies in the military stalemate pertaining at the time when the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) took the strategic decision to halt its terrorist campaign.[21] Despite evidence to the contrary, an alternative narrative has become "mainstreamed" within sociology and criminology, which demonstrates a willingness to simply ignore the empirical and theoretical insights of these political scientists and historians. Worryingly, that narrative also reproduces the Blairite predilection for fudging political decisions and indulging in outright fabrications. And the net result of maintaining a "siloised" view of the historical record—albeit through the medium of pedagogical and proselytising layering of the "noble" actions perpetrated by ex-terrorists—is still the same: they are rebranded as "peacemakers" and "community builders."[22]

Arguably, the beneficiaries of this framing have been Northern Ireland's one-time radical voices—namely, Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—who have predictably conflated the resilience of the peace process with their own policy agendas. This dynamic has been compounded by the propagation of the idea that

Sinn Féin and its military wing, the Provisional IRA, were responsible for ending the conflict.[23] While the Provisional IRA undoubtedly took bold and risky steps to help consolidate the peace process, such as decommissioning, running down its paramilitary structures and, eventually, supporting the police; to more sceptical observers these concessions were made purely to the benefit of their own understanding of what "peace" means. Thus, even when Sinn Féin were in the process of recognising the Police Service of Northern Ireland, its leaders Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness only partially co-operated with the Saville Inquiry (McGuinness, who was Officer Commanding of the Provisional IRA on "Bloody Sunday," claimed he was bound by a militaristic/Mafioso "code of honour") and refused to cooperate with the investigation and civil proceedings that followed the Omagh bombing—despite repeated personal pleas from the relatives of victims.[24] Although Sinn Féin later accepted policing reforms, this occurred begrudgingly and following the fact that it had been made clear to republicans that a "commitment to support the [reformed police service] had become the *sine qua non* of any future settlement."[25]

Understandably, this misinformed teleology forms the basis of much of Sinn Féin's contemporary discourse, yet it has also proven useful as a shorthand for academics and journalists and was largely internalised by New Labour ministers and apparatchiks who remained dogged in their determination to bring the "lessons" of one of their few domestic policy successes to bear in the foreign policy arena and the ongoing "war on terror."[26]

A similar, if more low-key, self-congratulatory teleology underpins the DUP's narrative, in which the changes that the 2006 St Andrews' Agreement made to the procedures by which the First and Deputy First Ministers in the Northern Ireland Assembly would be elected, are extolled as a new vision of democracy. Ignoring the impact of local events, such as the Provisional IRA's involvement in the murder and intimidation of Catholic civilians (and dissident republicans) and the Northern Bank robbery, Sinn Féin's acceptance of policing reforms, and the global reaction against terrorist methods following 9/11, the DUP's Peter Robinson (currently Northern Ireland's First Minister) claimed in 2008 that: "The DUP has buried the Belfast Agreement . . . We have laid the foundations for peaceful, stable devolution based on the application of democratic standards for everyone."[27]

While this article builds on critiques of these self-serving stories,[28] its main goal is to interrogate the narrative of the peace process built on a normative and empirical awareness of the importance of change at the level of civil society. Briefly stated, that narrative describes how in the 1980s and 1990s, cross-community links—based in large part on the desire of leftist-oriented community workers, such as the key umbrella group Community Foundation for Northern Ireland (CFNI), to develop a common strategy for tackling issues associated with working class social deprivation—emerged as a counterpoint to the ghettoised sectarianism that resulted from and fed back into the terrorist campaigns. The result of such "outreach" initiatives in towns and cities across Northern Ireland was the creation of a growing expectation and desire for a peaceful political environment through which socio-economic improvements could be gained.

We are not concerned here with examining the links or consistencies between these grassroots changes and strategic shifts among the North's political elites.[29] Rather, our central goal is to deconstruct the normative lessons that criminological and "terrorological" theorists have drawn from this community outreach work. To repeat: those lessons suggest that NGOs and CBOs are, by virtue of their proximity

to terrorist organisations, essential for building peace.[30] Thus, terrorists—or, in the discourse of conflict transformation theorists and the former Secretary General of the United Nations, "ex-combatants" or "activists"—must not be marginalised or required to account for their crimes; punishment and retribution are to be sidelined in favour of restitution and reconciliation; and "post-conflict" (or "transitional") societies (not to mention their victims) are expected to countenance the "disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration" of the perpetrators of violence, murder, and war crimes. Our central contention is that that narrative depends upon and perpetuates a self-serving paradigm—namely, that NGOs and/or CBOs occupy a higher moral ground than agencies directly linked to the state—that is saturated with political assumptions, that is value-laden, and that is empirically unreliable.

The Multiple Meanings of "Peace"

The concept of "peace" has generated no universal definitions. In Roman times it meant little other than subjugation of an entire people by a victorious imperial legion. In reality (both historically and contemporaneously) "peace" is not a neutral end-state but a détente between antagonistic belligerents, who have employed, or threatened to employ, the use of force to attain a stated end goal. In this sense "peace" is not so much the opposite of "war" (the latter term defined by the pre-eminent theorist of warfare Carl Von Clausewitz as "the extension of political discourse by other means") but the equilibration established by two or more belligerents, who find themselves caught between escalation and de-escalation of their conflict. Arguably, there is an idealistic fallacy in peace studies, which sees peace through atavistic eyes: i.e., as a natural state of being. Even the prominent peace studies scholar John Paul Lederach recognises the limits of this altruistic narrative. In Lederach's view peace is the uneasy relationship between belligerents, carefully managed so as not to spill over into outright hostility and violent conflict. Thus, he argues that post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation must envision the future in a way that enhances interdependence between the parties in conflict.[31]

Moreover, peace can be used for either benign or malign ends, as is suggestive of the *Pax Romana* example, and can actually reinforce common misperceptions of the causes, trajectory, and consequences of the conflict. In fact, even those scholars who claim to be supporting the reinstatement of peace are far from adhering to Johann Galtung's dictum of "peace by peaceful means" and are instead risking perpetuating the conflict by other means. In short, the weapons in this meta-conflict are narratives underpinned by their own notions of what constitutes peace. As some scholars have recently pointed out in a growing body of literature on the liberal peace: "peace has been invented and reinvented throughout history, with each reinvention reflecting the dominant values and power that dominate that particular era."[32]

The Galtungian-Lederachian view of a maximalist peace informs criminologically inspired critiques of terrorism[33] and peace-building.[34] In this view, ensuring parity in socio-economic opportunity goes hand-in-hand with ensuring that perceptions of grievances and exclusion are diminished and alleviated. Indeed, criminologically-inspired critics perceive a demonstrable reluctance by "orthodox, mainstream terrorologists" to adopt empathetic attitudes to what they term "activists" or "ex-combatants." This is a methodological failing, they argue, which is compounded by the unwillingness of the defenders of the liberal-democratic state to countenance conflict resolution methods that lie outside the bounds of the state. As an alternative,

criminological theorists argue that not only are ex-combatants influential in mediating disputes and setting the agenda for debates within and between post-conflict communities,[35] but that their demonstrable leadership skills should be utilised for the purposes of engendering peace.[36]

In Northern Ireland, the initial (and, arguably, continued) fragility of the peace process lent a sense of urgency to these arguments—particularly, the idea that the "scars" of the past must be healed in order for society to move forward.[37] This has had wider echoes and—as Kofi Annan's sentiments (cited at the beginning of this article) illustrate—is increasingly taken as a *sine qua non* for societies emerging from violent conflicts. Marcel Baumann, for example, argues that:

> The prerequisite for the divided communities being part of the same post-conflict society is to achieve a common, not a divided understanding of the violent past in order to move forward: understanding the other's 'understanding' of violence means to reach a mutual understanding that both sides fought a campaign which from their own perspective was just and legitimate. The morality of the 'other's violence' has to be recognised.[38]

As with Annan's statement—and in chorus with the idea held by Northern Irish criminologists—that former terrorists should be listened to because of their innate "community leadership," we find it difficult to engage with the moral vacuity and prolix sophistry of Baumann's contention. That it requires victims of terrorism to be reconciled with perpetrators of terrorism is such an obvious objection that little more needs to be said. However, this brand of theorising also does violence to the historical fact: that the vast majority of people in Northern Ireland disavowed the assassinations and bombings carried out by the main terrorist groupings.[39]

The evidence presented in recent work by McAuley *et al.* reaffirms our viewpoint. They argue that the lack of a comprehensive mechanism for "dealing with the past" creates an imperative to engage critically with former terrorist "community involvement" in the present. Moreover, they also point out that among those ex-terrorists, "ideological antipathy remains intact . . . the past has not been abandoned, but a more pragmatic approach to the articulation and advancement of ideological goals has been adopted."[40] In other words, Northern Ireland has not experienced a "Year Zero"—and while a "transition" is undoubtedly taking place, protagonists remain convinced of their narratives and their current political projects, accordingly, depend upon demonstrable and visible continuities with the past.

Northern Ireland and the "Peace Consultancy Industry"

Of course, former terrorists are perfectly within their rights to hold fast to what they perceive as justifiable, ethical, and coherent ideological beliefs. The problem is that the perpetuation of assumed historical continuity within those beliefs militates against the stated goals of the British government and the community sector for encouraging some form of a shared future for Northern Ireland.[41] As we pointed out above, the involvement of the NGO-CBO sector is seen by many criminological and political science theorists to be essential for fostering and encouraging peace. However, as Audra Mitchell demonstrates, problems arise when governmental policies are framed using the idea that these groups are "representative" of society at large.[42] She goes on to argue that the nexus of political groups in Northern Ireland

is based around the "incentive" that governmental funding offers—thus, groups understandably emphasise a narrative that suggests they "represent" "certain groups of people." While Mitchell's critique raises important questions concerning ideas and procedures related to democratic scrutiny and accountability, these issues are sidestepped in the zero-sum, ethnic conflict situation that is Northern Ireland. In this situation, the NGO-CBO sector is inevitably closely linked to communities that are in-themselves highly reified and to a large degree ideologically coherent.

Working under the banner, "supporting people, strengthening communities, building peace," CFNI is one of the major NGOs in the Province (along with other organisations such as Mediation Northern Ireland and Healing Through Remembering) and one of the main providers of funds for community-based initiatives. From its establishment as the Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust in 1979, CFNI has attempted to combat economic deprivation, social exclusion, and the malignant effects of inter-communal violence.[43] Given that all these still exist, the continued funding of the organisation is, at the very least, perplexing. Of course, CFNI might presumably respond by arguing that things are better now than they were in 1979, but things were better in 1979 than they were, for example, in the early years of the conflict when the death tolls were highest. Since the signing of the 1998 Agreement, CFNI has—unlike, for example, Mediation Northern Ireland—become increasingly involved with funding ex-terrorist groups. While part of that difference might be put down to the fact that the latter is more specifically dedicated to facilitating the resolution of localised inter-communal disputes, whereas CFNI has an (arguably) broader commitment to "peace building";[44] however, it may also be seen to arise from the idea that it is important to bring ex-terrorists into "civil" or "normal" society. As the Foundation's director, Avila Kilmurray, pointed out in 2004, this would be achieved by establishing steering groups to encourage dialogue:

> One such Committee was composed of representatives of all the parami-
> litary ex-prisoner groups, from all sides of our sectarian divide, who met
> some eight times a year to make recommendations on funding applica-
> tions received relating to the re-integration of ex-prisoners into society.
> Two years earlier they had been killing each other. This was high level
> risk-taking for peace, and it happened at a time when politicians were
> refusing to meet each other.[45]

The decision that tackling social exclusion and the effects of inter-communal violence can be achieved by the courting of ex-terrorists is a notable achievement in and of itself. Further, it has had several offshoots. Firstly, the project has expanded to include practitioner/academic input through the commissioning of research reports from Brian Gormally and Kieran McEvoy—both of whom have been heavily involved in community restorative justice schemes and the voluntary prisoner welfare group, the Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettle-ment of Offenders.[46] The danger with this approach is that it abridges the "lessons of the past" to a focus on what perpetrators rather than victims have learned, and in so doing valorises terroristic self-exculpations and self-justifications.

A second significant achievement is the almost £3 million of PEACE III funding that the Northern Ireland Executive spent on a Key Stage 4 learning resource.[47] Based on ex-prisoners' narratives of the conflict—and produced as a result of collab-oration between the CFNI and ex-prisoners' groups such as *Coiste an n-Íarchimí* and

EPIC—the "history" book and DVD has, according to the then Minister for Education, Sinn Féin's Catriona Ruane, "a strong emphasis on anti-sectarianism" and the need for ex-prisoners to "contribute positively" towards building a peaceful society so as to "ensure that history does not repeat itself."[48] Given the lack of emphasis on anti-violence, alternatives to the conflict (such as the peaceful and mass civil rights movement), or to the terrorists' victims, it may not be completely unfair to take "positive contribution" to refer to whatever is beneficial for the perpetrators of the violence.[49] In this instance the danger of valorising terroristic narratives over the very real effect of violence on victims is borne out. Thus, teachers are advised that that "[t]he term 'paramilitary' is not used in this resource as political ex-prisoners see it as a term associated with gangs etc. that disregards their political motivation" (CFNI, 2010, p. 15). The absence of any suggestion of approval from Northern Irish educational authorities is indicative of the ambiguous educative value of asking 15- and 16-year-olds to place ex-terrorists' self-pitying narratives of family break-up, parental disapproval, and psychological breakdown on a "consequence wheel"—particularly when the "consequences" for victims is filtered through a nebulous framework of collective responsibility:

> I met the brother of one of my victims once. I didn't know it at the time. I don't know what I would have said, could have said…That's on a personal level. On a more wider victim-survivor [sic] I don't think I'd have a problem speaking about those general things. But the personal thing I find difficult.

The pragmatic and myopic morality that lies at the heart of this project is described by several academic and civic society voices at the end of the "book," including Professor Kieran McEvoy, Professor Monica McWilliams (current Chief Commissioner of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission), and Dr Peter Shirlow. The latter, for example, concludes that,

> …former prisoners are trying to do as much as they can to stop a return to violence and to train and assist young people to think more positively about the other community. All of this work is based upon respect and mutual tolerance.

Of course it is very difficult to argue against such lofty ideals and dedication; however, the essentially navel-gazing and vacuous nature of the exercise becomes apparent when terms such as "the other community" are deployed inclusively and as means of silencing the voices of those who might be wary about countenancing ex-terrorists. Taken a step further, it may not be completely cynical to infer that normal community relations means enforced "reconciliation" with the very people who destroyed relationships within and between communities for over thirty years.

Why should this matter? Well, if peace is simply taken to mean "stability" (or something akin to "negative peace"), then, of course, what we have in Northern Ireland is not stability at all; it is what one community relations worker refers to as "a truce."[50] However, if peace is taken to mean something more; if it is taken to involve principles of justice, accountability, responsibility, participation, and equality (elements of "positive peace"), then the Northern Irish settlement process needs to be seen as involving deeper political, juridical, communal, and personal

issues.[51] The key point is that everyday life in Northern Ireland takes place within an overarching political framework relating to conflict transformation and to the transitional phase from violence to peace. The insinuation of the idea that the conflict was about something justifiable or inevitable and the exclusion of the fact that the vast majority of the people of the North rejected the violence points to something more than a struggle over the historical record: it suggests an internalization, at the level of the personal and the everyday, the leitmotifs and values of the conflict—values and leitmotifs redolent with sectarianism, division, and crude, violent political power.

The valorisation of terrorism is exacerbated in the very reluctance by proponents of an anti-state narrative to frame their position in class rather than ideological terms. Yet, owing to the repetition of platitudes, that structural bias is concealed rather than articulated. Rather than the debate occurring around questions of class or nationalist politics, anti-state theorists couch their rhetoric in pseudo-Marxian language and depict ''the state'' as an outside and malevolent presence that suppresses communal aspirations. In many ways, this is simply a rehash of the Weberian vision of a dominant state and defenceless communities, which, in purely political science terms, is severely anachronistic to the point of being virtually worthless as an explanatory model.[52] Thus, as McEvoy and Gormally explain,

> . . . the term 'from below' [in relation to transitional practices] is increasingly used to denote a 'resistant' or 'mobilising' character to the actions of community, civil society and other non-state actors in their opposition to powerful political, social or economic forces.[53]

Given that recent research has questioned the ideological narratives upon which the justification for terrorist violence is based,[54] it remains a moot point about individual terrorist experiences, even if they are orientated towards the altruistic goals of preventing further radicalism and extremism developing in and convulsing their respective communities. What we must guard against is the substitution of the historical record with these narratives, of how we understand the past, and how that is used to equip individuals and communities for facing the future. There is evidence that such narratives are inherently anti-state and prone to being manipulated by political elites to justify their current policies. Thus republicanism has proven itself to be much more sophisticated in inventing and reinventing itself and its definition of what constitutes peace for the wider nationalist community. Moreover, Sinn Féin has been much more astute in communicating that to its grassroots than other political parties. Generally speaking they have done so by relying on the middle-range actors, such as NGOs and CBOs, to draw them closer into contact with civil society and ultimately the state itself. As Kevin Bean has observed, these ''contradictions are built into the institutionalized power of the movement, which ensures that the Provisional state is unlikely to wither away.''[55]

Northern Ireland and the "Terrorism" Debate

To return to the question we referred to above: *Why* does any of this matter? This section argues that the over-estimation of the role of NGOs and CBOs—in which former terrorists participate in creating and fostering the Northern Irish peace—matters a great deal, in both policy and ethical terms. While that over-estimation

may be seen as verging on a tendency towards the recycling and reproduction of terroristic narratives, at the very least it contributes to the institutionalisation of a particularistic conception of "peace." The maximalist conception of peace that lies at the heart of such policies essentially proceeds from a tautological view of what a peace process should look like—thus ideas about inclusivity obviously mean bringing terrorists in from the "cold." The incongruity of including terrorists, while re-marginalising and re-silencing the victims of their crimes, is, however, tantamount to a Panglossian perspective on transition, that has everything to do with moralising and little or nothing to do with morality—a perspective that has everything to do with teleology and little or nothing to do with empirical reality.[56]

In part, this is perhaps predictable. After all, debates over the nature and character of terrorism have centred on the moral trappings of the concept, with some critics emphasising the pejorative connotations of its usage by states and supranational institutions. We, instead, employ the term in the analytical sense, as a coercive strategy for sub-state actors wishing to influence the behaviour of a stronger opponent.[57] The very use of the term "terrorism" to describe the actions of republicans and loyalists in Northern Ireland has been dropped from the academic discourse in favour of terms such as "combatants," "activists," or "paramilitaries," seemingly in order to emphasise the political core of their violence. Yet even this is subject to abuse, with commentators preferring to emphasise the political and ideological nature of republican violence vis-à-vis the criminal and nefarious violence perpetrated by loyalists.[58] Such double standards are discernable even in the current public discourse on counter terrorism. For instance, in the British government's own stand-point on terrorism there is a tendency to draw a clear distinction between the laudable ends, if not the ways and means, of Irish republican terrorists and the less-than-noble strategic priorities of the Islamist variant.[59] Indeed, many of those who reject the term "terrorist" or "terrorism" insist that the concept has always had—under all circumstances—"root causes," which, they argue, go some way towards explaining why individuals engaged in violent acts.[60]

The Provisional republican interpretation employed to explain the reason for the IRA's ceasefire plays up the organisation's own narrative outlining why it called a cessation to its military operations. Interestingly, I. William Zartman's conflict resolution theory of "mutually hurting stalemates" and "ripe moments"[61] is frequently used as a way of justifying the importance of the IRA ceasefire in laying the foundations of the peace process.[62] Moreover, the received narrative plays up republican principles, downplays the positive role played by the British government in instigating negotiations, and neglects the part played by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, British Army, and pro-state loyalist terrorists in applying coercive pressure on republicans.[63] It also conveniently dismisses the role played by deep penetration agents in steering the republican war machine towards ending its violence.[64]

As we pointed out above, the valorisation of the inclusion of terrorists and the amplification of their narratives—and of their "important" role in the peace process—risks mainstreaming or institutionalising a narrative bias in favour of their own post-hoc self-justifications. This can be seen in the promotion of Provisional republicanism as a positive force for change in the period leading up to and in the immediate wake of the 1998 Agreement.[65] So, while the peace process may indeed have occurred following initiatives by nationalist leaders to engage in more constructive negotiations, those initiatives were based on the de facto abdication of previous hard-line stances on British withdrawal and the need for an executive role for the Southern state in the running of Northern Ireland.[66]

This narrative is perhaps explicated most clearly in Kevin Bean's recent work on the relationship(s) between the Provisional IRA and the British state. Bean, for example, argues that through a combination of hard and soft power, successive British governments effectively strangled Provisional terrorism. In particular, Bean focuses on the latter and charts how the government "mainstreamed" Provisional republicanism by controlling the framework within which community groups and inward investment initiatives operated in republican areas. Thus, he argues that,

> To the state, the [P]rovisionals were people it could do business with, and they remained indispensable in the management of conflict. The toleration of a republican pseudo-state within limits that did not challenge the authority of the 'real' state remains an acceptable if messy compromise.[67]

Intriguingly, nowhere does Bean, or other scholars of republicanism such as Martyn Frampton or Henry Patterson for that matter, make the claims that sociologists and criminologists make regarding the need of elevating terrorist assassins to the status of community leaders. In fact, rather than indulging in terroristic narratives regarding the importance of them doing the "heavy lifting" of the peace process,[68] Bean's explanation depends on the idea that the peace process arose out of—and occurred within—certain patterns of more or less acceptable behaviour on the part of terrorist organisations, which were ultimately determined by the state.

That narrative contrasts strongly with the early criticisms of British obtuseness in the face of a return by the PIRA to armed struggle in 1996–97 that lambasted the state for wasting the opportunity for peace. Two of the chief proponents of this view concluded that this had more to do with "the influence of those within the state with a vested interest in a return to violence, it is indisputable that a significant opportunity for peace has been wasted to date."[69] Such a critical viewpoint was congruent with Sinn Féin criticisms of the British government's decision to request decommissioning of IRA weapons prior to admitting the political representatives of the IRA into talks. Retrospectively some unelected government advisors criticised former government policy on this matter,[70] suggesting that the IRA's political representatives should have been admitted to inclusive negotiations.[71] This seems all the more unbelievable given that the two main negotiators on the Sinn Féin team, Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, were still active members of the terrorist group's ruling Army Council at the time when they were negotiating with other parties to the conflict.[72] Thus, even during the breakdown of the PIRA's ceasefire in 1996, Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams pointed out that:

> Peace in Ireland can only be achieved through honest dialogue and democratic negotiations based on equality. This is not a military problem. It is a political problem which was militarised by the British. It needs a political solution; that can only be achieved by dialogue.[73]

That terrorists should pay lip-service to the democratic process is nothing new. Indeed, Neumann and Smith remind us that despite the near-universal failure of terrorist campaigns, the most successful have survived by evolving into political parties or social movements.[74] In the case of the Provisional IRA its longevity has been assured by the capacity to regenerate its message at a community level and establish what one scholar has called the "Provo pseudo state."[75]

While it may be expedient for a government to "talk to terrorists" who are willing to negotiate,[76] there seems to be a logical gap between that pragmatic stance and the fact that those terrorists are seeking to *transcend* the democratic foundations of the state itself—that is, while they are working within Northern Ireland's administrative structures, the end goal remains reunification and to that end those structures are considered transitory and transformative. Certainly, the Adams-McGuinness peace strategy has become a vehicle for administering British rule in a partitioned state. Yet, while their theology refuses to recognise that state, their apparent acquiescence cannot be taken as apostasy—rather, it may be more helpful to view actions such as signing up to support the police service (while refusing to encourage supporters to give information about the Omagh bombers) to the authorities as a way of transcending the state: of coming within its auspices while at the same time moving beyond them. Indeed, Adams and McGuinness have consistently made it clear that the 1998 Agreement is but a "stepping stone" to reunification. Yet this politico-theology also speaks to the peace process, or rather the very idea of "peace," in an intensely problematic way. This is because it is this very dilemma—namely, the fluidity of the Sinn Féin position—that encapsulates the Ulster Unionist disillusionment with the peace process. This "anxiety"[77] was, if anything, heightened by Blair's handling of the peace process and is summed up eloquently by the commentator Dennis Kennedy:

> If peace can be achieved, even with a measure of appeasement, then it is worthwhile. This is the strongest argument for the Belfast Agreement. It still leaves the appalling truth that a small subversive group ready to employ ruthless terror against the civilian population cannot be defeated in a democratic society where it commands only tiny minority support . . . But part of the price has also been a blatant rewriting of history. The distortion of events and of language that is now deemed a necessary part of the 'peace process' is worrying. Terrorists are not required to surrender arms, but (eventually) to 'decommission' them. 'Decommissioning' is a term coined to accommodate the IRA's assertion that it is a legitimate army fighting a war. Its representatives negotiated a settlement within which both sides can reasonably claim moral authority.[78]

As we noted above, "critical" interpretations of the work of "orthodox" terrorism experts often lambast "terrorologists" for being too "committed and practically engaged in supporting Western state power."[79] A common criticism is that "terrorologists" are too willing to overlook indiscriminate attacks by states on civilians in armed conflict and are consequently fixated on the illegitimate nature of violence perpetrated by non-state actors.

Conclusion: Towards a "Negative Peace"

The political scientist Feargal Cochrane has observed that "[u]nless steps are taken to deal with the physical and psychological scars of war, it cannot be said to have ended and the likelihood is that it will re-emerge at a later date."[80] While it seems intuitively correct to say that past hurts must be treated or else they will fester and pollute the body politic in the future, in fact there is little or no empirical evidence for Cochrane's claim. Even in societies such as Germany and Spain, where debates over the past lay dormant for two generations, changed political contexts

meant that there would be no reprisal of fascism or a re-run of the civil war.[81] Cochrane's analysis proceeds along further dead-ends, adopting as he does the morally relativistic stand-point that both state and non-state based violence is wrong. Again, the very plausibility and the reasonableness of this position are part of its essential redundancy. For as Elizabeth Stanley points out:

> In the current climate of the 'war on terror', where the methods and calibration of torture are commonly discussed as if the potential victims do not humanly exist and as if there is no terror or pain, such work on torture might have a practical use. It might offer a way to understand the dynamic nature of power, and how it is played out through legitimised state violence as well as within the everyday fear experienced by those who sense themselves as targets.[82]

Stanley argues that such work may reveal something of the power dynamics at work behind human rights abuses but it simultaneously covers its own position in a cloak of ostensible objectivity. Just as she argues that this assumption of innocence is not enough when dealing with torture, neither is it sufficient for analysing terrorism. Indeed, this idea is implicit in the Clausewitzian paradigm of warfare, which holds that "war is the extension of politics by other means."[83] In this view, contention is ever-present and political interaction always depends on the "clash of interests."[84] Of course, it is important to understand where those interests come from—and critically empathise with the beliefs that perpetuate the clashes. However, empathy does not mean countenancing terrorists' narratives nor does it mean that all voices have an equal right to be heard.

Indeed, the tragedy of Northern Ireland is not that it is too bound up with its past but is rather related to the fact that it has heard too much from one set of voices from the past—the voices that chose to perpetuate a "war" that resulted in over 3,703 deaths and approximately ten times that figure injured.[85] While those voices may have suffered themselves, there is no doubt that they also benefited from the polarisation of political culture that the violence helped to sustain. The crucial lesson is that the extolling of those voices may actually be disruptive of peace, resulting as it does in the amplification of perpetrators' stories and the silencing—or, at the very least, distortion—of their victims' experiences. In this view, complaints of "othering" or "demonising" terrorists is a red herring[86] because, in this way, the pursuit of knowledge serves to suppress understanding and the inclusion of terrorist acts to the detriment of a peaceful transformation of the conflict.

We have suggested that the anti-state critique of terrorism studies depends on a superficially successful mixture of a range of semi- or unarticulated assumptions regarding peace, the role of the state, and the role of "liberal-democratic" analysts. While these critics are certainly correct to voice concerns over state-sponsored terrorism—where it exists—we have found their alternative model to be singularly lacking in political, historical, or moral understanding. We argued that this consists of structurally biased political assumptions based on chronologically truncated "transitions," a superficial dichotomy of state-versus-community, and an empathetic approach to terrorist narrative understandings that neglects victims' experiences and verges on explaining away murder.

While we express surprise that criminologists (who generally espouse a nuanced appreciation of "the state") have propagated a neo-Weberian model, as regards the

Northern Irish case in particular, we find it difficult to explain the rejection or the reluctance to engage with socialist and left-wing alternatives to the ideological, anti-state model. Indeed, in their evaluation of a stream of grassroots dealing with the past initiatives funded by the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Gormally and McEvoy appraised the work of Trademark, a training organisation associated with the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. While they admitted that respondents who had experienced Trademark's ''political'' approach to the past were positive, Gormally and McEvoy's self-appointed task of identifying lessons ''for the future'' seemingly militated against a serious consideration of Trademark's methodology.[87] While that approach may be criticised for taking an ''instrumental'' view of the history of the Northern conflict in a similar way to the anti-state analysts, it is nevertheless qualitatively different, insofar as it links sectarianism to prejudice and discrimination and argues that social justice demands that these attitudes be interrogated and challenged. As Trademark points out, ''[c]hanging attitudes that are assumed to be sectarian demands that those doing the challenging are aware of their own sectarian prejudice and have the facilitative skills to talk about these divisive issues.''[88] While we are reluctant to breach the Biblical injunction to ''first take the log out of your own eye,'' this article has suggested that the anti-state terrorist critique not only singularly fails to initiate serious debate over how we approach the study of terrorism or account for the impact of terrorist actions, but through its obfuscations it reframes the agenda in favour of terrorists and against their victims.

Notes

1. J. Galtung, ''What if the devil were interested in peace research?'' *Journal of Peace Research* 25, no. 1 (1988), 2.

2. K. Annan, ''Foreword to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards'' (N.P.: United Nations Secretary-General, December 2006), http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/foreword.pdf

3. House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee, *Preventing Violent Extremism*, Sixth Report of Session 2009–10 (London: The Stationery Office, 16 March 2010), 3.

4. Ibid., 68.

5. As one critic of the government's policy towards the Muslim community has observed: ''At the level of the community, which is differentiated by ethnicity, culture, social class, region and sect, a number of Muslim civil society and community organizations are working at the grassroots and their activities are delivering some valuable outcomes. As developments emerge in the light of concerted efforts to confront the problems of extremism, what will remain important are issues that exist at the heart of the problem. For most Muslims in Britain there is pernicious socio-economic and ethno-cultural exclusion. As structural pre-conditions emerge to permit education, jobs, and housing opportunities, only then will groups value their presence in society by becoming engaged citizens in the context of an ever-evolving national politico-cultural framework'' (440). See Tahir Abbas, ''Ethno-Religious Identities and Islamic Political Radicalism in the UK: A Case Study,'' *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 27, no. 3 (2007): 429–442.

6. See also G. Champion, BBC Radio 4, ''Prison is 'not taming' Islamic radicals,'' http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8615390.stm

7. House of Commons Report (see note 3 above), 67.

8. See B. Barton and P. Roche, *The Northern Ireland Question: The Belfast Agreement and the Peace Process* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); M. Cox, A. Guelke, and F. Stephen, *A Farewell to Arms? Beyond the Good Friday Agreement* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); A. Edwards and C. McGrattan, *The Northern Ireland Conflict: A Beginner's Guide* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2010); J. Tonge, *Northern Ireland* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006).

9. See the comments from former Sinn Féin activists, turned "dissidents," in S. Breen, "The Fresh Face of Rioting is Nothing New in Ardoyne," *Sunday Independent*, 19 July 2009. Full details of Sinn Féin's "peace strategy" can be found archived at: http://www.sinnfein.ie/files/DefendingtheGFA.pdf

10. *The Guardian*, 6 March 2009. The threat level was increased from "substantial" to "severe," meaning an attack was highly likely.

11. ISC, *Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2009–10*, Cmd. 7844, (London: TSO, March 2010), 11. Emphasis in original.

12. *The Independent*, 9 September 2009; *An Phoblacht*, 10 September 2009.

13. IMC, *Twenty-Third Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission* (London: TSO, May 2010), http://www.independentmonitoringcommission.org/documents/uploads/23.%20Twenty-Third%20Report.pdf

14. Purvis was loyalism's sole Northern Ireland Assembly representative and a staunch advocate of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. For background on the PUP and its relationship to the UVF see A. Edwards, "The Progressive Unionist Party of Northern Ireland: A Left-wing Voice in an Ethnically Divided Society," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 12, no. 4 (2010): 590–614. For these recent developments within loyalism, see L. Clarke, "The paramilitaries finding new energy, *Sunday Times*," 8 June 2010.

15. IMC, *Twenty-Fourth Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission* (London: TSO, September 2010), 3, http://www.independentmonitoringcommission.org/documents/uploads/Twenty-Fourth%20Report.pdf

16. On the "residual" threat posed by terrorism to the peace process see A. Edwards, "Abandoning Armed Resistance? The Ulster Volunteer Force as a Case-study of Strategic Terrorism in Northern Ireland," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32, no. 2, (2009): 146–166 and A. Edwards, "When Terrorism as Strategy Fails: Dissident Irish Republicans and the Threat to British Security," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 34, no. 2 (2011): 318–336.

17. Among other accounts, see P. Dixon, *Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008); E. O'Kane, *Britain, Ireland and Northern Ireland since 1980: The Totality of Relationships* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007).

18. P. Shirlow, J. Tonge, J. McAuley, and C. McGlynn, *Abandoning Historical Conflict? Former Political Prisoners and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010).

19. The idea that terrorists should be excluded from government underpinned the first devolved, power-sharing administration in Northern Ireland and much of government policy during the conflict; further additional arguments could be made to support our questioning of the easy linking of terrorist groups with inclusive democracy: Firstly, it was Provisional republicans and constitutional nationalists more so than the British government who compromised and accepted ideas about consent, decommissioning, and the fact that Britain would not "persuade" Ulster unionists to join a united Ireland (see, for instance, J. Bew, M. Frampton, and I. Gurruchaga, *Talking to Terrorists: Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country* (London: C. Hurst & Co, 2009)). Secondly, our contention has the benefit of avoiding the possibility that terrorist groups use ceasefires or power-sharing and consociational arrangements as stopping-off points, allowing themselves to regroup for a further push (see, for example, R. Alonso, "Pathways Out of Terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country: The Misrepresentation of the Irish Model," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 4 (2004): 695–713; and D. M. Tull and A. Mehler, "The Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa," *African Affairs* 104 (2005): 375–398.

20. C. McGrattan " 'Order out of Chaos': The Politics of Transitional Justice," *Politics* 29, no. 3 (2009): 164–172; C. McGrattan, "Community-Based Restorative Justice in Northern Ireland: A Neo-Traditionalist Paradigm?," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 12, no. 3 (2010): 408–424. For evidence of how terroristic narratives are being disseminated to a wider audience see the remarkable publication, *From Prison to Peace: Learning from the Experience of Political Ex-Prisoners – A resource for Local and Global Citizenship at Key Stage Four* (Belfast: CFNI, June 2010).

21. See, for instance, Bew et al. (note 19 above); K. Bean, *The New Politics of Sinn Fein* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007); M. Frampton, *The Long March: The Political Strategy of Sinn Féin, 1981–2007* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); H. Patterson, *The Politics of Illusion: A Political History of the IRA* (London: Serif, 1997).

22. J. Powell, *Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland* (London: The Bodley Head, 2008). Examples of the eulogising of ex-terrorists are K. McEvoy and A. Eriksson, "Restorative Justice in Transition: Ownership, Leadership and 'Bottom-Up' Human Rights," in D. Sullivan and L. Tifft, eds., *Handbook of Restorative Justice: A Global Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2006); and P. Shirlow and K. McEvoy, *Beyond the Wire: Former Prisoners and Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland* (London: Pluto, 2008).

23. See Sinn Féin, "Defending the Good Friday Agreement," *Sinn Féin's Submission to the Mitchell Review* (23 September 1999), http://www.sinnfein.ie/files/Defendingthe GFA.pdf

24. On McGuinness's refusal to break the PIRA "code" and answer questions about his involvement in the events of Bloody Sunday, in which 14 unarmed demonstrators were shot dead by British troops, see L. Clarke, "Let's measure comments on Bloody Sunday," *Newsletter*, 15 June 2010; on the reluctance of Adams and McGuinness to offer help to the families of the 29 people and two unborn babies killed in the Omagh bombing of 1998 in capturing those responsible, see R. D. Edwards, *Aftermath: The Omagh Bombing and the Families' Pursuit of Justice* (London: Harvill Secker, 2009). Interestingly, the IRA patently refused to co-operate with the Eames-Bradley Consultative Group on the Past, with only the loyalist UVF terror group agreeing to discuss helping to meet the needs of victims.

25. Frampton (note 21 above), 174.

26. For example, see G. Adams, *Hope and History: Making Peace in Ireland* (Dingle: Brandon, 2004); E. Mallie and D. McKittrick, *The Fight for Peace: The Secret Story behind the Irish Peace Process* (London: Mandarin, 1997); B. O'Leary, "Mission Accomplished? Looking Back at the IRA," *Field Day Review* 1, no. 1 (2005): 216–246; P. Hain, *Peacemaking in Northern Ireland: A model for conflict resolution?*, speech by Peter Hain MP, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Chatham House, 12 June 2007. See also "Northern Ireland's lessons for Kirkuk to be discussed," *BBC News Online* (20 November 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/8369315.stm; A. Fisher, "If you can't beat them, join them," *Al Jazeera* (17 November 2009), http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/afghanistan/2009/11/2009111719012341119.html

27. P. Robinson, "Agreement was only a hindrance to peace," *Irish Times*, 7 April 2008, 11.

28. The most detailed recent critiques are Alonso, and Bew et al. (see note 19 above); E. O'Kane, "The Uses and Abuses of the Irish 'Model,'" *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 12, no. 2 (2010): 239–256; and C. McGrattan, "Learning from the Past or Laundering History? Consociational Narratives and State Intervention in Northern Ireland," *British Politics* 5, no. 1 (2010): 92–113.

29. C. McGrattan, *Northern Ireland, 1968–2008: The Politics of Entrenchment* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

30. Among others, see A. Eriksson, "Challenging Cultures of Violence through Community Restorative Justice in Northern Ireland," *Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance* 11 (2008): 231–260; K. McEvoy, B. Gormally, and H. Mika, "Conflict, Crime Control and the 'Re'-Construction of State-Community Relations in Northern Ireland," in G. Hughes, E. McLaughlin, and J. Muncie, eds., *Crime Prevention and Community Safety: New Directions* (London: Sage, 2002), 182–212; K. McEvoy and B. Gormally, "'Seeing' is Believing: Positivist Terrorology, Peacemaking Criminology, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process," *Critical Criminology* 8, no. 1 (1997): 9–30.

31. J. P. Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 27.

32. R. MacGinty, *No War, No Peace: The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and Peace Accords* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008), 41.

33. We employ the term "terrorism" to denote the use of violence by non-state groups for political ends. Audrey Kurth Cronin has identified four key aspects of terrorist activity: a political nature; symbolic use of violence; purposeful targeting of non-combatants; and violence carried out by non-state actors, which, unlike the state use of force, is not restricted by international norms and conventions. See A. K. Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 7.

34. See R. Jackson, M. Breen-Smyth, and J. Gunning, *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda* (London: Routledge, 2009).

35. K. McEvoy and P. Shirlow, "Re-imagining DDR: Ex-combatants, leadership and moral agency in conflict transformation," *Theoretical Criminology* 13, no. 1 (2009): 31–59.

36. McEvoy and Eriksson (see note 22 above).

37. A. Guelke, "Commentary: Truth, Reconciliation and Political Accommodation," *Irish Political Studies* 22, no. 3 (2007): 363.

38. M. Baumann, "Understanding the Other's 'Understanding' of Violence: Legitimacy, Recognition, and the Challenge of Dealing with the Past in Divided Societies," *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 3, no. 1 (2009): 109.

39. K. Simpson, *Truth Recovery in Northern Ireland: Critically Interpreting the Past* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).

40. J. W. McAuley, J. Tonge, and P. Shirlow, "Conflict, Transformation, and Former Loyalist Paramilitary Prisoners in Northern Ireland," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 1 (2010): 24.

41. NIO, "A Shared Future—Policy and Strategic Framework for Good Relations in Northern Ireland" (N.P. [Northern Ireland Office, Belfast], 2005, http://www.asharedfutureni.gov.uk/

42. A. Mitchell, "Transforming a Divided Civil Society? Governance, Conflict Transformation and NGOs in Northern Ireland, 1970–2006," in M. Hilton, N. Crowson, and J. McKay, eds., *NGOs in Contemporary Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), 142–160.

43. See http://www.communityfoundationni.org/opencontent/

44. For Mediation Northern Ireland see http://www.mediationnorthernireland.org/

45. "Interview—Avila Kilmurray," *Alliance Magazine* (1 August 2004), http://www.alliancemagazine.org/node/2037

46. See J. Auld, B. Gormally, K. McEvoy, and M. Ritchie, *Designing a System of Restorative Community Justice in Northern Ireland: A Discussion Document* (N.P.: The Authors, 1999).

47. The Community Foundation for Northern Ireland was the lead partner in this scheme. Details of CFNI's accounts can be found at http://www.seupb.eu/Libraries/PEACE_III_Reports_Pubs/PEACE_III_Monthly_Progress_Report_-_January_2010.sflb.ashx

48. NIE [Northern Ireland Executive] (2010), "New Learning Resource will deliver Valuable Lessons from the Past," http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/news/news-de-040610-new-learning-resource.

49. H. Patterson, "Republicans will mourn most at PUP's demise," *Newsletter* (11 June 2010), http://www.newsletter.co.uk/politics/Republicans-will-mourn-most-at.6355567.jp?articlepage=1

50. Interview with a Community Relations worker from a loyalist background, Belfast, 16 December 2008.

51. Lederach (see note 31 above). See also D. Mendeloff, "Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?'," *International Studies Review* 6 (2004): 355–380.

52. For alternative visions of the idea of "the state" and multilayered "governance" see M. Keating, *Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); M. Keating, "European Integration and the Nationalities Question," *Politics and Society* 32, no. 3 (2004): 367–388; M. Keating, "Thirty Years of Territorial Politics," *West European Politics* 31, nos. 1–2 (January-March 2008): 60–81.

53. K. McEvoy and B. Gormally, "Editor's Introduction," *Critical Criminology* 8, no. 1 (1997): 12.

54. See, for example, T. Hennessey, *The Evolution of the Troubles, 1970–72* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007).

55. Bean (see note 21 above), 131.

56. M. Burleigh, *Moral Combat: A History of World War II* (London: Harper Press, 2010), viii.

57. P. R. Neumann and M. L. R. Smith, *The Strategy of Terrorism: How it Works, and Why it Fails* (London: Routledge, 2007), 93.

58. For a more nuanced examination of the media's preoccupation of "loyalist gangsterism" see G. Spencer, *The State of Loyalism in Northern Ireland* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008).

59. Home Office, *Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism* (London: TSO, March 2009), Cmd. 7547, 11, 23, 36, 59.

60. See L. Richardson, *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat* (London: John Murray, 2006).

61. I. W. Zartman, "The Timing of Peace Initiatives," in John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, eds., *Contemporary Peacemaking* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003). For a sophisticated response to the rush to employ Zartman's model to explain Northern Ireland see E. O'Kane, "When Can Conflicts be Resolved? A Critique of Ripeness," *Civil Wars* 8, no. 3 (2006): 268–284.

62. As recently as April 2010, in his annual Easter Oration to Provisional republicans in Milltown Cemetery commemorating the "patriotic dead" of the IRA, Gerry Adams recalled how "the people's army—the IRA—was an undefeated army when it took brave decisions to support the Sinn Féin peace strategy and to create the present opportunities for a new future." G. Adams, *Gerry Adams' Easter Speech, Milltown Cemetery, Belfast, 4 April 2010*, http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/18398. See also L. Friel, "Operation Banner: British Army Did Not and Could Not Defeat IRA," *An Phoblacht*, 12 July 2007.

63. For more on the coercive strategy applied by the Security Forces in the 1970s and the transition to "police primacy" see A. Edwards, "Misapplying Lessons Learned? Analysing the Utility of British Counter-insurgency Strategy in Northern Ireland, 1971–76," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 21, no. 2 (2010): 303–330.

64. While this history remains largely unwritten, the exposure of high-profile informants within the Provisional movement such as Dennis Donaldson and Freddie "Stakeknife" Scappaticci point to British state infiltration at the highest echelons of the movement. See also G. Clarke, *Border Crossing: True Stories of the RUC Special Branch, the Garda Special Branch and the IRA Moles* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2009) for an "insider's" depiction of intelligence gathering in the 1970s.

65. See the important address by Gerry Adams to the IRA in April 2005, in which he asked them, "Can you take courageous initiatives which will achieve your aims by purely political and democratic activity?," http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/15207

66. For a detailed exploration of Northern nationalism see G. Murray and J. Tonge, *Sinn Féin and the SDLP: From Alienation to Participation* (Dublin: O'Brien Press, 2005).

67. Bean (see note 21 above), 15.

68. Shirlow and McEvoy (see note 22 above), 5.

69. McEvoy and Gormally (see note 53 above).

70. Powell (see note 22 above).

71. Incredibly, this view endorsed the IRA's own demands for "a negotiated settlement." See "IRA announce with regret ending of cessation of military operations," http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/15230. And "IRA Statement on the Bombing of British Army Headquarters in Lisburn, County Antrim," 8 October 1996, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira81096.htm

72. E. Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA* (London: Penguin, 2007), 378, 380. R. English, *Terrorism: How to Respond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1, 118.

73. G. Adams, "Bad faith and dishonesty Following the IRA bomb: Gerry Adams accuses the British government of criminally neglecting the peace process," *The Guardian*, 12 February 1996, 14.

74. Neumann and Smith (see note 57 above).

75. Bean (see note 21 above).

76. See P. Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (London: Routledge, 2006), 4. A. Edwards, "Talking to Terrorists: Political Violence and Peace Processes in the Contemporary World," in A. Edwards and S. Bloomer, eds., *Transforming the Peace Process in Northern Ireland: From Terrorism to Democratic Politics* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2008), 195–211.

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81. A. Rigby, *Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001). See also J. Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (London: Harvard University Press, 1997) and P. Aguilar, *Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2002), translated by Mark Oakley.

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83. C. von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 149.

84. Ibid.

85. D. McKittrick, S. Kelters, B. Feeney, C. Thornton, and D. McVea, *Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles* (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2004). In contrast state Security Forces killed only 363, 184 of whom were civilians. Republican paramilitaries killed approximately 2,000 people and loyalists killed approximately 1,000. Interestingly, republicans and loyalists murdered more of their own members than each other during the troubles.

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87. McEvoy and Gormally (see note 53 above), 8, 44–46.

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